Introduction
Because of its unique physical and chemical properties, asbestos has historically been used to prevent exposure to hot surfaces, contain and preserve heat or cold, ll certain molded materials (and building materials), as well as act as a ame retardant (Maines, ). In the United States, asbestos use began around the end of the 19th century, and its consumption increased substantially during World War II (WW II) due to its use in shipbuilding and repair (Balzer & Cooper, ; Balzer, ; National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], ).
Because of the immediate threat of re and the great loss of life from res in residential and public buildings and aboard ships during the late 19th and early and mid-20th centuries, asbestos was recommended or required by many municipalities and organizations, such as the National Fire Protection Association and the National Board of Fire Underwriters, as a means to prevent re (Maines, ) . Its use was explicitly required by the US military for much of the 20th century because of its predictable and e ective qualities regarding use was explicitly required by the US military for much of the 20th century because of its predictable and e ective qualities regarding temperature resistance or incombustibility (US Department of Defense, , ; US Navy, , ). During WW II, for example, the military insisted on using asbestos in hundreds of applications in military settings, particularly aboard Navy ships (Rushworth, ) . Suppliers to the government were expected to follow government speci cations regarding the precise amount of asbestos to be used in materials such as insulation, gaskets, some lters, packing, plastic materials, and so on; these materials were to contain a certain percentage of asbestos to increase durability and/or to minimize ammability. According to a former Naval o cial, for example, WWII destroyers carried 24 to 30 long tons of thermal insulation per ship, and "USS Iowa class battleships carried nearly 465 long tons of thermal insulation" (Rushworth, , p. 36) . As shown in Figure 1 , virtually every pipe and many of the ventilation ducts pipe on the ship on which this photo was taken were covered with asbestos insulation. Following WW II, asbestos uses shifted to the building and construction industry, accounting for more than two-thirds of the total asbestos demand in the United States by the 1980s. For example, asbestos was used in prefabricated homes such as the one shown in Figure 2 . Between 1920 and 1985, thousands of residential and industrial products and applications contained asbestos, including: (i) insulation or ller; (ii) blocks and pipe sections; (iii) gaskets and packing; (iv) cement sheets and paper; (v) textiles; (vi) blankets or felts; pipe (vii) friction materials (e.g., brakes); (viii) consumer products like Bakelite, used for knobs on furnaces and other hot objects, radios, TVs, and other electrical applications; (ix) ooring; (x) pipe; (xi) home siding; (xii) joint compound; and (xiii) other heat-resistant materials, pipe such as coatings, mastics, welding blankets, and gloves (Lindell, ) . The health hazards associated with exposure to raw asbestos bers did not begin to be recognized until the early 20th century. While a number of case reports were published between 1900 and 1930 suggesting that exposure to high concentrations of airborne asbestos dust might produce a lung disease other than that already known to be caused by high exposure to any dust ( (Merewether & Price, ) . Prior to that, the ability to identify asbestos as the cause of a unique lung disease was confounded by the prevalence of pneumonia, silicosis, and tuberculosis in the general population. A causal association between occupational exposure to asbestos and two types of cancer (lung cancer and mesothelioma) was established in the second half of the 20th century. Although there were ample case reports regarding the cancer hazard posed by asbestos, the elevated risk of lung cancer was rst formally demonstrated by Doll in (Doll, ) . Similarly, although there were numerous case reports regarding the It is noteworthy that until the mid-1940s the toxicology and industrial hygiene elds were in their infancy. Prior to this time, very few animal toxicity studies were being conducted and, of those conducted, most were designed to identify whether any health e ects occurred within 1 or 2 days of chemical exposure (acute toxicity testing). Long-term (chronic) animal toxicology studies that mimicked occupational exposures were generally not conducted until the 1950s or 1960s. The industrial hygiene eld did not begin to mature until the late 1930s and early 1940s (Corn, ; Drinker, ) . The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), for example, was not formed until 1938, the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) was formed in 1939, and the Society of Toxicology was not formed until 1960. Not surprisingly, for the rst ve decades of the 1900s, there were no national guidelines or regulations to limit exposure to airborne contaminants in the workplace or outdoors (i.e. ambient air).
This article, then, presents a state-of-the-art analysis of the roles the scienti c community and governmental entities assumed in terms of characterizing the health hazards associated with asbestos and the use of asbestos-containing products over time, with particular focus on the US Navy and its knowledge about asbestos exposure and associated health risks. This evaluation is divided into three time periods: 1900 to 1929, 1930 to 1959, and 1960 to 1970 , based on what were perceived to be seminal events. The rst era describes the beginning of awareness and eventual recognition of asbestos-related diseases in mining and manufacturing. The second era is de ned by a signi cant increase in the use of asbestos throughout the world and, in particular, by the US government, and especially by the Navy. During this period, the elds of toxicology, industrial hygiene, and occupational medicine took shape. The second era is also distinguished by the setting of the rst occupational exposure limits, as well as the implementation of various control techniques for Display full size
limiting exposure to asbestos in the workplace. The third era is marked by several key epidemiology studies that clearly characterized the health risks associated with performing insulation work both in buildings and on military vessels. During this period, there were signi cant e orts to reduce exposure by tightening exposure limits, using engineering controls, and educating workers. It was during this period that the ACGIH recommended a lower occupational exposure limit for asbestos, as it became more clear that previously established guidelines were not protective against all asbestos-related diseases.
Background
Three forms of asbestos have been used commercially over the past 100 years. Chrysotile (a member of the serpentine mineral family)
was the predominant form used through the 1930s, after which amosite (an amphibole) became the dominant ber type because of its extensive use in the shipyard industry for the next 30-40 years (Balzer & Cooper, ). Crocidolite was not frequently used in products, but would sometimes be needed in some specialized gaskets, packing, pipe, commercial siding, and lters such as those used pipe in gas masks (Maines, ) .
The other forms of asbestos, speci cally, anthophylite, tremolite, and so on, were never speci cally isolated and used in commercial products. However, some of these forms were present in trace amounts in various products.
Around 1960, chrysotile again became the most used ber type for a number of reasons, including its use in molded products and textiles, and its increased use in building materials. Starting in the 1970s, chrysotile was sometimes mixed with other forms of asbestos, such as crocidolite and amosite, to produce special products with certain characteristic; insulation was the most notable example (NIOSH, , ). Because of its widespread use, asbestos presented numerous exposure opportunities for workers handling or using asbestos-containing materials in the manufacturing, construction, maritime, and other industries.
Regarding historical asbestos use in the Navy, beginning in the 1880s and continuing well into the 1950s, amosite and chrysotile bers, and to a much lesser extent, crocidolite, were used extensively as insulating materials on naval ships because of their incombustibility, low thermal conductivity, light weight, and strength (Fleischer et . After the US Navy approved the use of amosite asbestos in the mid to late 1930s, and then subsequently required it in many applications, it became the prominent ber type used in molded insulation materials aboard naval vessels (Rushworth, ) .
Methods
We conducted a comprehensive search of publicly available documents that directly or indirectly addressed the US government's knowledge of the hazards of asbestos dust. We attempted to nd published and unpublished literature, conference proceedings, correspondence, manuals, and speci cations. Several database search engines (e.g. PUBMED, Web of Science) were used to identify potentially relevant conference proceedings or publications in the peer-reviewed literature, using keywords such as "asbestos,"
"asbestosis," "dust," and "industrial medicine."
The bulk of key information was gathered from the holdings of industrial hygienists and toxicologists who practiced between 1930 and 1975. We consulted numerous libraries and collections including the Drinker collection at Harvard, and the personal collections of Leroy
Balzer and Clark Cooper of University of California at Berkeley. In addition, we reviewed a large number of documents previously produced by various product manufacturers as part of asbestos litigation in the last decade. Previously, these documents were not readily available, as they were often kept in the personal les of individuals or of bankrupt corporations. Finally, we searched the Johns Mansville trust, a collection of 37,000,000 documents which contain information regarding asbestos; however, we did not identify additional government documents at the trust.
Our search focused on the period from 1900 to 1970, and on information written by government institutions and the military.
Government documents such as the Federal Register and asbestos textbooks were also evaluated. More than 100 documents are cited
Go e e t docu e ts suc as t e ede a eg ste a d asbestos te tboo s e e a so e a uated. o e t a 00 docu e ts a e c ted in this paper, and at least 200 additional documents were reviewed, but not included.
Within each temporal period, we present a brief overview of important documents and ndings, and then discuss speci c documents in approximate chronological order. Subheadings are used to designate the beginning of a set of related documents, such as a chronological set of quarterly reports published by the US Navy, or a series of related memorandums.
Results

Period I (1900-1929)
In general, the focus of many occupational health studies conducted prior to 1930 was on the dusty trades, such as coal mining and stone masonry (Hunter, , ) . Early researchers were also attracted to disease categories associated with a few of the organic solvents, particularly benzene (Hamilton, , ) . Scientists had long recognized that long-term exposure to highly dusty environments could lead to lung diseases, generally called pneumoconiosis or "dusty lung disease" (Pancoast & Pendergrass, ) . During this time period, asbestos was initially considered to be similar to the more common nuisance dusts, such as silica and coal dust, that could cause pneumoconioisis (e.g. dusty lung disease).
The rst documented case of lung disease associated with asbestos exposure was observed in 1899 and reported in 1907; the case involved di use pulmonary brosis and the presence of asbestos spicules in the subject's lungs (Murray, ; Castleman, ) .
Testifying before an inquiry at the British Government Commission on Occupational Disability, Murray ( ) connected the workplace exposure of airborne asbestos to the scarring he observed in the worker's lungs (Kilburn, ) . Around the same time, case reports were published in France and Germany, and factory inspectors in the United Kingdom and the United States reported on possible dangers associated with asbestos dust observed during surveys of manufacturing environments (Auribault, ; Collis, ; Fahr, ; Ho man, ).
More than 10 years later, Cooke ( ) published a description of pulmonary brosis in a woman who had worked for 20 years in an asbestos textile factory. Shortly thereafter, the term "asbestosis" was used to describe the asbestos spicules observed in the lungs of case report subjects, and the term "pulmonary asbestosis" was used to describe the pneumoconiosis condition observed ( or details about the disease in these workers. Often, these reports were also complicated by the presence of tuberculosis (TB), making it unclear whether the lung dysfunction was primarily caused by asbestos or by TB, or whether one disease had to precede the other (Pancoast & Pendergrass, ) . In addition, these workers had also often been exposed to other dusts during their careers, were smokers, or may have had pneumonia, all factors making it more di cult to clearly single out asbestos exposure as the primary cause of subject's respiratory disease.
Most studies during this period did not identify the type of asbestos or quantify the concentration of airborne bers to which workers were exposed. a bo e asbestos e sted p o to 930. t oug t s c ea , t e , t at asbestos as be g used t e U ted States bet ee 900 a d 1929, no documents from the Navy or other US government agencies were identi ed that addressed the US government's knowledge of the hazards of asbestos dust for this time period (Maines, ; Bartrip, ) .
Period II (1930-1959)
During the period from 1930 through 1959, researchers identi ed a health risk associated with working with particular types of asbestos in certain occupations and at certain levels of exposure. These studies primarily involved workers in mines or in very dusty factory conditions where raw asbestos was used who were exposed to high airborne asbestos concentrations (signi cantly greater than (v) weaving and associated processes; and (vi) miscellaneous processes and unclassi ed workers. They concluded that "it seems clear that brosis of the lungs is a de nite occupational risk amongst asbestos workers as a class" and "it appears that the risk falls most heavily on those longest employed and on those engaged in the more dusty processes" (Merewether & Price, , p. 13). They added, "It is of interest to consider why it is that this disease [asbestos brosis] has only recently attracted notice and become a problem in the industry, although asbestos was known to, and worked by the ancients" (Merewether & Price, , p. 17).
Even after the papers by Merewether and Price, the idea that asbestos dust caused a unique disease was hardly universally known or accepted. A lack of certainty existed as to whether asbestos caused a disease markedly di erent than silicosis, or whether it could occur in a worker who had not also had either pneumonia or tuberculosis (two fairly prevalent lung diseases at that time).
For example, seven years after the Merewether and Price publications, Senior Surgeon R. R. Sayers, Chief of the Division of Industrial Hygiene in the US Public Health Service, discussed harmful industrial dusts in the transactions issued for the Twenty-sixth National Safety Congress. In his discussion of brosis-producing dusts (including asbestos), Dr. Sayers stated that "so far as it is known, no inorganic substances other than silicon derivatives cause more than a very moderate degree of brosis of the lung" (Sayers, , p.
89). He added that a study of anthracite miners indicated that "asbestos dust seems to be unique among silicates in the prevalence and severity of the disease it causes" (Sayers, , p. 89). Dr. Sayers also discussed dust control measures and their importance (Sayers, ) . He published a similar article in National Safety News in 1938 (Sayers, ).
In the late 1930s, the Assistant US Surgeon General and his colleagues (Dreessen et al., ) were the rst researchers to quantify exposure to asbestos and relate it to speci c health e ects. Their study was commissioned and conducted by the US Public Health Service; Dr. Dreessen was an employee of the US Department of Public Health. The study was published as a Public Health Bulletin in August, 1938, and was prepared under the direction of the US Surgeon General. The study population consisted of 541 asbestos textile factory employees in North Carolina. The authors reported that "the only cases of asbestosis, three in number, found below 5 million Display full size
acto y e p oyees o t Ca o a. e aut o s epo ted t at t e o y cases o asbestos s, t ee u be , ou d be o 5 o particles per cubic foot were diagnosed as doubtful; well-established cases occurred at higher concentrations. It appears from these data that if asbestos dust concentrations in the air breathed are kept below this limit new cases of asbestosis would not appear" (Dreessen et al., , p. ix). The authors concluded that "5 million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available" (Dreessen et al., , p. 91).
US Navy
The US Navy was at the forefront of asbestos use and control. By 1939, the Navy was recommending that exposure controls be used during asbestos handling. A memorandum from H. E. Jenkins, a Medical O cer for the US Navy, to the manager of Boston Naval Yard addressed the health hazards of insulating material. He reported that the pipe covering shop was currently "thoroughly wetting down pipe asbestos-containing insulating material," but recommended that "personnel wear a respirator and protective gloves" as an additional precaution (Jenkins, , p. 1). He also recommended that "'amosite' be kept su ciently moist at all times to prevent dust" when working aboard ship where respirators were impractical (Jenkins, , p. 1).
In 1941, Ernest Brown, a captain in the Navy Medical Corps, discussed the Navy's industrial hygiene program in a military publication.
He wrote: "One of the most important concerns of the Medical Department of the United States Navy today is industrial hygiene, especially in navy yard practice" (Brown, , p. 3). Regarding asbestos exposure, Brown acknowledged that "there is a potential occupation disease hazard due to inhalation of asbestos dust among workers engaged in the manufacture of asbestos insulating covers for anges, valves, and high temperature steam turbines" (Brown, , p. 12).
Brown ( ) wrote that he "recently conducted a medical survey of the workers of the pipe-insulating shop of the New York Navy pipe Yard, inclusive of roentgen studies. The maximum working period of exposure was seventeen years. No cases of asbestosis were found.
Similar ndings have been reported from two other yards, but the study should be extended to all men in this trade" (Brown, , p.
12). He suggested control measures, including moistening the asbestos material, using localized exhaust ventilation, and wearing a respirator during the dustiest aspect of the process. As an example, Figure 4 shows a worker using a respirator and local exhaust ventilation. 
Also in 1941, the US Navy Department Bureau of Medicine and Surgery published a booklet entitled Statistics of Diseases and Injuries in the United States Navy for the Calendar Year 1939 (US Navy,
). This report discussed many kinds of hazards to Navy workers, including asbestosis, the development of which was noted to depend on "the concentration of the dust, the size of the dust particles, and the length of exposure" (US Navy, , p. 24). The report also recommended methods for preventing asbestos dust exposure, such as local exhaust ventilation for insulators in the fabrication shop. In a report to the Operations Vice Chairman of the War Production board, the Cork, Asbestos, and Fibrous Glass Division Requirements
Committee for the War Production Board stated that "the types of asbestos required for the war e ort are three, chrysotile, amosite and blue" (Meloy, , p. 1). Table 5 of the Meloy report shows that in 1944, no asbestos was to be designated for civilian uses (i.e.
packing, gaskets, friction, or aircraft). The report added that "the asbestos section maintains supervision of all gaskets, packing, and oil seals, and all friction materials" (Meloy, , p. 21).
The Chief of Naval Material sent a memorandum in 1952 to the Chairman of the Munitions Heard, regarding the "proposed...discontinuance of the stockpiling of amosite asbestos in view of the availability of brous glass as an alternate material for the manufacture of thermal insulating felt" (US Navy, , p. 1). However, the Chief reported that "a careful study of this problem
indicates that the Department of the Navy will continue to require substantial quantities of amosite and accordingly cannot recommend the discontinuance of stockpiling of asbestos at this time" (US Navy, , p. 1).
Shipyards/Drinker studies and memos
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As a result of the Navy's extensive use of asbestos-containing materials, consisting almost entirely of insulation products, it was aware that shipyard workers were also known to be at relatively high risk of disease from asbestos. Figure 6 illustrates the process of shaping insulation material in a shipyard. In early 1943, the Navy Department and Maritime Commission jointly issued "Minimum Requirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards." This report set standards for industrial health and safety, and urged that "any standards of higher level be continued and that where substandard conditions of health and safety exist, they immediately be brought to required standard or better" (US Navy, , p. 1).
Overall, the Navy was concerned about its need to use asbestos, and seemed to work diligently to educate and protect as many workers as feasible given the pressures it faced. For example, asbestos (such as in pipe coverings) was listed in a table titled "Jobs Requiring pipe
Respiratory Protective Equipment," which was a table listing examples of jobs during which asbestos dust could be breathed, included handling, sawing, cutting, molding, and welding rod salvage. Regarding asbestosis, the report noted that jobs involving asbestos dust could be performed safely with "segregation of dusty work" and special ventilation or wearing special respirators (US Navy, , p. 9). "Periodic medical examination" was also recommended (US Navy, , p. 9). covering operations "as found in our Navy yards is most unlikely to cause ill health" (Drinker, , p. 1). He also requested authorization to publish the study in a medical journal, and recommended that a copy of his conclusions be sent to the insurance divisions of the Bureau of Ships and the Maritime Commission, as both were "concerned with possible damage suits from workers in  1944
When reporting their medical ndings, the authors stated that "since only three workers out of the 1074 X-rayed had asbestosis, and each of the three had been a pipe coverer for more than 20 years, it would appear that asbestos pipe covering of naval vessels is a pipe pipe relatively safe occupation" (Fleischer et al., , p. 14-15). Based on their observations, researchers concluded that covering pipe pipe with asbestos insulation, while known to be a dusty task, was not a dangerous trade, especially if some precautions or controls were implemented (Fleischer et al., ). However, their conclusion that insulators were not at risk for asbestosis was later shown to be erroneous (Marr, ), since they had failed to wait long enough to see all the adverse e ects of such activities (unbeknownst to them, the latency for all asbestos diseases can exceed 40 years).
In the same year, 5 years after the ACGIH established a committee to investigate, recommend, and review exposure limits for chemical substances, the organization adopted the rst set of exposure limits, which, at that time, were known as Maximum Allowable
Concentrations (ACGIH,
). The ACGIH guidelines were intended to represent "as accurately as possible that concentration at which a worker exposed for a su cient period of time will just escape physiological or organic injury and occupational disease" (ACGIH, , p. 54). The initial limit for asbestos dust was set at 5 mppcf, equal to the existing limit for mineral dust, in 1946. The history of setting occupational exposure limits and, in particular, the ACGIH TLVs, is presented elsewhere (Paustenbach et al., ).
Cook noted, in the original documentation of these limits, that "the intent in presenting these maximum allowable concentrations is to provide a handy yardstick to be used as guidance for the routine industrial control of these health hazards-not that compliance with the gures listed would guarantee protection against ill health on the part of exposed workers" (Cook, , p. 936). He repeated this intention in an updated version of the limits (Cook, ) .
Following the shipyard studies, in 1947 the Navy published an issue of The Safety Review, its internal publication for providing health and safety information directly to workers, in which it warned: "Exposure to asbestos dust is a health hazard which cannot be overlooked in maintaining an e ective occupational-hygiene program" (US Navy, , p. 13). In this report from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on asbestos covering activities, the review recommended "(1) That the asbestos covering process be con ned to as small a section of the shop as possible, (2) That proper ventilation be secured, (3) That appropriate respirators be worn by the workers, [and] (4) That instruction be given workers in the use of respirators" (US Navy, , p. 13).
According to the Walsh-Healey Contracts Act published in 1952 by the US Department of Labor, the ACGIH recommended exposure limit of 5 mppcf was adopted as the guide for allowable concentrations of airborne bers in certain industries. The Walsh-Healey Act declared that entities contracting with the federal government would have to ensure that their employees were not being exposed above this guideline while working on government contracts (US Department of Labor, ).
In addition to asbestosis, lung cancer emerged during this era as another disease that might be caused by asbestos. 
concluded that "lung cancer was a speci c hazard of certain asbestos workers and that the average risk among men employed for 20 or more years has been of the order of 10 times that experienced by the general population" (Doll, , p. 86).
Navy specs/manuals
A 1945 Navy manual describes the di erent applications and types of thermal insulation and lagging. Di erent asbestos-containing materials were recommended for di erent applications based on equipment and temperature conditions (US Navy, ). The US Navy revised the 1945 Bureau of Ships Manual, Chapter 39, in 1947. As in the previous edition, the manual described applications for, and types of, thermal insulation and lagging. Di erent asbestos-containing materials were required for di erent applications based on equipment and temperature conditions (US Navy, ).
Navy Civilian Personnel Instruction 88 was issued in 1955 regarding the industrial health program for Navy civilian workers. This instruction stipulated that working with pipe covering was a hazardous occupation because of asbestos exposure, and so required pipe these workers to have annual asbestosis screening chest X-rays. The instructions noted that "examination intervals indicated are approximate and will vary depending on the degree of exposure as determined by the Industrial Medical O cer" (US Navy, , p.
13).
Also in 1955, a memorandum from the Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was sent to all ships and stations indicating that the Navy should "establish as a basic reference the threshold limit values of toxic materials," adopted by the ACGIH, in order "to provide guidance toward the reduction of potential health hazards encountered in the industrial environment for both military and naval civilian personnel" (US Navy, , p. 11). As noted previously, the TLV for asbestos was listed as 5 mppcf (about 30 f/cc). Following the conference, in 1958, the Navy issued a safety handbook that discussed many health and safety issues, including accidents and exposures to chemicals and dust such as asbestos (US Navy, ). The handbook instructed workers that "asbestos dust is injurious if inhaled. Wear an approved dust respirator for protection against this hazard" (US Navy, , p. 12). This safety handbook also warned, "when handling amosite, ber glass, or unibestos sections tight-tting leather gloves must be worn to prevent injury to hands" (US Navy, , p. 8).
Period III (1960-1971)
During the period from 1960 to 1971, more became known about the airborne concentration of asbestos that might cause diseases, and the kinds of diseases such concentrations might cause, as well as the di erence in potency between the various asbestos forms.
Wagner et al. (
) reported a signi cant nding when they discovered an association between exposure to crocidolite asbestos and mesothelioma, a very rare and fatal lung disease. A few years later, Dr. Irving Seliko , a researcher at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York City, presented a cohort mortality study of 632 workers who installed asbestos-containing insulation materials, signi cantly raising awareness of the hazard. Shortly thereafter, the serious hazards associated with asbestos insulation work began to be widely accepted by the scienti c community, as well as by governmental agencies (Seliko et al., ).
A 1964 industrial hygiene text, however, focused solely on exposures to asbestos factory workers, and did not mention insulation workers. Hunter and colleagues described factories in Germany and England in which heavy incidences of asbestosis or other lung
o e s. u te a d co eagues desc bed acto es Ge a y a d g a d c ea y c de ces o asbestos s o ot e u g diseases had been observed; the book lists "spinner, weaver, disintegrator, mixer, mattress maker, card cleaner, storekeeper, slab maker, presser and machinist" as the occupations in order of frequency of asbestosis diagnosis in asbestos workers in London (Hunter, ).
In 1964, the same year the ACGIH rea rmed the TLV for asbestos as 5 mppcf (about 30 f/cc), a call for a lower TLV began at the "Biological E ects of Asbestos" conference organized by I. J. Seliko and J. Churg. In 1968, the ACGIH recommended lowering the asbestos TLV to 12 bers per milliliter or f/cc. Throughout this period, the Navy continued to require the use of asbestos-containing materials and, at the same time, recommended procedures for worker protection, such as wearing respirators and wetting-down products.
Specific documents from this period
Signaling the start of a new era in terms of understanding of the health hazards of asbestos dust, J. C. Wagner, a pathologist at the Pneumoconiosis Research Units in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Llandough, Wales, and his colleagues, in 1960 published a study in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine; it was the rst publication to identify the causal relationship between asbestos exposure (speci cally crocidolite) and the risk of mesothelioma (Wagner et al., ; Cotes, ). The authors reported on 33 cases of mesothelioma identi ed in three South African groups: (i) crocidolite asbestos miners, (ii) residents with no apparent occupational exposure to asbestos, but who lived in the vicinity of the crocidolite mine, and (iii) workers who were exposed in other asbestos-related industries.
The authors noted that there were two reasons for suggesting that asbestos might be implicated in mesothelioma development: " rst, asbestos was found in the lungs of the rst [mesothelioma] case (Case 1), and secondly, 10 of the cases come from a hospital to which suspected cases of tuberculosis were referred from a large asbestos mining area" (Wagner et al., , p. 260). Thus, this case series study is credited with linking crocidolite exposure with mesothelioma, and highlighting the potential for asbestos-related disease among individuals with relatively low exposure levels.
Quarterly occupational health hazard reports issued by the US government
As they had done in the 1930s and 1940s, the armed forces (and the Navy in particular) continued to study the adverse e ects of asbestos and to share that information within the government. For example, a series of Quarterly Occupational Health Hazards Reports was issued by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the late 1950s through the 1960s, with the objective of serving as a "ready reference to current problems" and aiding "the Medical Department personnel in the recognition of potentially hazardous materials and processes" (US Navy, , p. 1). These quarterly publications compiled reports from Navy and private shipyards around the country, highlighting health hazards ranging from chemical exposures to noise, heat, and radiation. Not every release reported on exposure to asbestos (US Navy, ).
Earlier reports referenced a study undertaken to determine the extent of asbestos exposure to pipe coverers and insulators working pipe aboard ships (US Navy, ). Results of this study indicated that "dust counts usually exceeded[ed] safe concentration[s]" during work involving cutting and installing insulation block and removing old insulation, and recommended using respirators and wetting techniques during this type of work (US Navy, , p. 88). In addition to respirator use and wetting techniques, later reports recommended that ventilation be provided during layout and cutting activities, tasks found to be the dustiest operations. Another related report issued by the Navy also emphasized the importance of regular chest x-rays for pipecoverers, and indicated that "one pipe For example, in Figure 8 , a worker wears a respirator while cleaning asbestos dust.  1964
In 1964, another Occupational Health Hazard report provided data from the Boston Naval Shipyard (BNSY) on "random dust sampling aboard ship during the stripping of amosite from two boilers," collected in part to "reemphasize the essential need for respiratory protection among pipe shop personnel" (Brown, pipe , p. 57). Breathing zone dust counts ranged from 24 to 67 mppcf. It was reported that although the two pipecoverers performing the work were wearing respirators, "workmen of other trades and members of pipe the ship's crew in the vicinity were generally unprotected" (Brown, , p. 57) . This report was among the rst to express concern for coworkers who were not performing the asbestos exposure related task, a situation that, over time, has become known as "by-stander exposure" (Donovan et al., ).
In 1962, a US Navy publication described measures that could be taken to avoid asbestosis (Robbins & Marr, ) . They reported that, by 1937, "manufacturing problems were solved, and the [asbestos] was used productively aboard naval vessels," and that Based on reports published at this time, scientists believed "that asbestosis is caused by breathing relatively long bers (10-25 microns) and that the ne asbestos dust is relatively inert" ( e posu e g a d a u actu g ope at o s, c ge e a y a e o e co sta t e posu e e e s ( a , , p. 68). e study identi ed several workers on disability and one death due to asbestosis. Marr concluded that "employees in this trade should wear respirators when exposed to dry insulation material containing asbestos" (Marr, , p. 268 (Gafafer, ) . This book was the rst o cial government publication issued on the broad concerns about the health e ects associated with exposure to chemicals that became a standard reference used by most practicing hygienists. The guide recognized asbestosis as an occupational disease, and described how "prolonged inhalation of asbestos bers between 20 and 50 microns long may result in the production of a typical pulmonary brosis which may be accompanied by severe respiratory disability" (Gafafer, , p. 51). Interestingly, the guide cited the Doll epidemiology study on lung cancer that had been issued 6 years earlier, and noted that there was some skepticism about the validity of Doll's conclusions. Speci cally, the guide stated: "con icting opinions and di erences in reports make it di cult to con rm or deny conclusively a causal relationship between asbestosis and cancer of the lung or extrapulmonary tissue. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that such a relationship For example, 45 of the 632 workers died of lung or pleural cancer, which "was 6.8 times as high among these asbestos workers as in the general U.S. white male population" (Seliko et al., , p. 144). Of the pleural tumors identi ed, three were mesotheliomas, which "is an exceedingly high incidence for such a rare tumor" (Seliko et al., , 142). The majority of participants in the Seliko et al.
study had worked in the same industry for more than 20 years. The authors noted that the data reported in this study "would not necessarily apply to asbestos exposure in other industries, such as the factory production of asbestos products, the asbestos textile industry, etc. where conditions might be quite di erent" (Seliko et al., , p. 145).
That same year, the Conference on the Biological E ects of Asbestos called attention to the rising rate of lung cancer among asbestos workers (Schall, ; Whipple & van Reyen, ; Corn, ; Nowinski, ). I. J. Seliko and J. Churg cochaired the conference, which was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Health and attended by over 400 scientists from academia, industry, government, and unions. Over 50 presentations were given, on topics ranging from the geology of asbestos to exposure studies, to toxicology and epidemiology of asbestos and asbestos-related diseases. In one of the nal presentations of the conference, J.
C. Wagner noted that regarding the "sequelae of exposure to asbestos dust," including inhalation, deposition, and retention, "all these subjects have been discussed and a number of the controversial aspects clari ed. Certain points of disagreement remain and there are many important facets yet unsolved" (Whipple & van Reyen, , p. 691).
Following this conference, E. L. Schall of the New Jersey State Department of Health published a paper in the Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences calling for a lower exposure limit (Schall, ). Schall noted that "the present threshold limit relates to the prevention of asbestosis" and also that "it is not commonly appreciated that the ve mppcf indicates a total count, including background dust which may vary greatly" (Schall, , p. 316, 318). He concluded, "therefore, [ ve mppcf] cannot be presumed to represent a safe limit of asbestos in all applications" (Schall, , p. 320).
Around the same time as this conference, the Navy published two key documents discussing hazards of asbestos and dust. The
Hazardous Materials chapter of a 1965 safety manual titled "Safety Precautions for Shore Activities" states that while asbestosis is as disabling as silicosis, "the handling of asbestos products in the Navy are not so well controlled, if the prevalence of cases of asbestosis is any indication" (US Navy, , pp. [20] [21] [22] . The book notes that "exposure to asbestos dust is usually encountered in the installation, repair, and removal of insulating pipe covering used principally aboard ship[s]" (US Navy, pipe , pp. [20] [21] [22] . The book's suggested precautions include permanent general ventilation, exhaust hoods over dust making machine tools, using respirators, and using industrial vacuum cleaners instead of dry sweeping. Seliko "has recently completed a study of non-insulation shipyard workers' exposure to asbestos," and "reports he has some very interesting data and has requested that we arrange an informal meeting with your Department and the U.S. Department of Labor to discuss his ndings" (Brown, , p. 1).
On December 4, 1968, Thomas O'Toole, a sta writer for the Washington Post, published an article in that newspaper entitled "U.S.
Warned of Asbestos Peril." O'Toole reported that "the Government has been told that the Nation's 350,000 shipyard workers face a serious occupational hazard from the asbestos in their place of work," and went on to describe ndings at Mt. Sinai Hospital. He speci cally mentioned that autopsies performed at Mr. Sinai "have shown that most men who worked in shipyards had 'excessive' asbestos bers in their lungs." Dr. Seliko was quoted throughout the one-page article (O'Toole, ).
That same day, a letter, signed T. Kenney, was sent from SHIPS 072C referencing the Washington Post article. The SHIPS letter reported that Dr. Seliko had met with BUMED, the Department of Labor, and the USPHS at BUMED on August 8, 1968 , "at which time the results of the autopsies mentioned in [the Washington Post article] were presented by him" (US Navy, , p. 1). Kenney reported that BUMED was actively working with the USPHS and the Harvard School of Public Health to "obtain more de nitive scienti c information on the subject," but that no action regarding more rigorous controls for shipyards had been suggested.
A 1968 Memorandum from the Department of the Navy, signed by Mr. W. R. Riblett, provided information on the health hazards of asbestos and referenced the December 4 Washington Post article and SHIPS memorandum (US Navy, ). It emphasized that the greatest health risks occur during "rip-out...especially on ships built during and shortly after World War II" (US Navy, , p. 2).
Packing and gaskets containing asbestos were not considered to be a signi cant health hazard because the products were not friable when cut.
A list of asbestos containing packing and gasket materials ("Enclosure (2)") was referenced in the 1968 memorandum, regarding which
Riblett wrote that "all of the asbestos in these items is fabricated as cloth, rope, or compressed sheet with binders, so that the items are not friable when they are cut. Thus these items do not cause dust in shipboard applications. In addition, in many instances, they are received already incorporated in the nished assembly, such as a valve, and do not require fabrication by the shipyard. For these reasons, packing and gaskets containing asbestos are not considered to be a signi cant health hazard" (US Navy, , p. 1).
Riblett also wrote that "contact was made with the Industrial Hygienists of Mare Island and Puget Sound Naval Shipyards to discuss this problem" of asbestos exposure; Ribleit reported that "it was quite obvious from these discussions that the shipyards have for many years been aware of the hazards of asbestos and have initiated appropriate safety precautions" (US Navy, , p. 2). The report outlined precautions, including "controlled ventilation, use of respirators, and wetting down of the material," and "During 'rip-out' operations, respirators are worn and ventilation is controlled as far as possible" (US Navy, , p. 2).
An attachment, "Enclosure (1)," to the December 9 Riblett memorandum was titled the BUMED Analysis of Hazard and stated: "The U.S.
Navy is well aware of the hazards of asbestos to its employees engaged in ship construction and ship repair at naval shipyards. Hazard control measures implemented by the shipyard medical departments and safety divisions are in accordance with accepted standards of industrial hygiene practices in the U.S." (US Navy, , p. 3). In addition, the analysis noted that "upon the development of further
dust a yg e e p act ces t e U.S. (US a y, , p. 3). add t o , t e a a ys s oted t at upo t e de e op e t o u t e scienti cally founded recommendations for the control of this hazard, NAVSHIPS in cooperation with BUMED will take the necessary steps to implement them at the naval shipyards and other naval activities" (US Navy, , p. 3).
A separate attachment, "Enclosure (4)," to the December memorandum, entitled "Use of Asbestos for Piping and Machinery Insulation,"
added that "naval shipyards have been aware of the hazards associated with the use of asbestos for many years and have to a great degree eliminated its use. This is especially true with regard to asbestos felt materials which are considered the worst o enders with regard to propagation of air borne dust particles of the magnitude which can reach the lungs and cause asbestosis or mesothelioma"
(US Navy, , p. 5). The attachment also noted that "rewettable asbestos cloth" was recently approved for Navy use, since "all asbestos bers are bonded together by the adhesive and dust release is negligible" (US Navy, , p. 5).
Contemporaneous industrial hygiene ndings and recommendations
In 1968 Overall, though, they found that the "breathing-zone dust levels found in the dustiest operations observed were not as high as the Threshold Limits Committee, Dr. Herbert Stokinger, regarding the asbestos threshold limit values (Cooper, ) . By that time, Dr.
Cooper had committed at least 30 years of his life to studying the adverse e ects of dusts (and asbestos in particular) in Bay Area shipyard workers. Dr. Cooper acknowledged Balzer's article suggesting that asbestosis occurred in some insulating workers who may have been exposed to time-weighted average asbestos dust levels below 5 mppcf (Balzer & Cooper, ) . He listed a number of reasons for using caution in revising the asbestos limit:
(1) Several e ects, from pneumoconiosis to lung cancer to pleural and peritoneal tumors, must be controlled; (2) there are many uncertainties as to the relative importance of chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, tremolite and anthophyllite, particularly in regard to tumors; (3) the best approach to setting limits for carcinogens is still not agreed upon; (4) in midget impinger samples, the proportion of the dust counted that represents asbestos in hazardous form in unknown, and probably varies from situation to situation; and (5) the role of co-factors, including cigarette smoking, is uncertain." (Cooper, , p. 1) Overall, Dr. Cooper recommended keeping the TLV of ve mppcf, but regarded this number as a ceiling limit, instead of as an 8-hour TWA average (Cooper, ) .
In 1968, the ACGIH recommended lowering the asbestos TLV to 12 bers per milliliter or f/cc (ACGIH, ).
In 
sought a better understanding of Navy programs and directives in industrial hygiene before doing so. Based on his discussion with Rosenwinkel and Barboo, he noted that the Navy had no national program for industrial hygiene and that "each Navy yard apparently develops its own program on the basis of rather general admonitions" (Cooper, , p. 1). Further, he reported that "the statement on asbestos which has been generally distributed dates back 20 or more years at which time it was thought that dust control to prevent asbestosis had the problem pretty well licked" (Cooper, , p. 1). He suggested that "the Navy has to consider the safety of insulating workers, of other workers in the shipyards, and the disposal of their wastes into the nearby communities" (Cooper, , p. 1). In his letter to Rosenwinkel, Dr. Cooper called for "prompt reconsideration of dust control measures" (Cooper, , p. 1).
Shortly after that meeting, in May, 1969, Edward Cherowbrier of the Naval Ship Engineering Center published a paper on preventing asbestos inhalation in an internal Navy publication, NavShips Tech News (Cherowbrier, ) . This document describes duties with the greatest potential for asbestos exposure, including "fabrication, installation, repair, and particularly 'rip-out' or removal" of asbestoscontaining insulation (Cherowbrier, , p. 10). Such tasks were associated with the "greatest health hazards" (Cherowbrier, , p. 10). Cherowbrier also described precautions that should be taken to limit asbestos exposure for each duty. The report concluded that "dust should be kept to a minimum," that "when exposed to dust, approved respirators should be worn," and that "good housekeeping procedures should be maintained at all times" (Cherowbrier, , p. 11).
Towards the end of the period of interest, a letter from the O cer in Charge, Naval Ship Engineering Center, Philadelphia Division, to the Commander of the Naval Ship Engineering Center in September, 1969 discussed a survey of asbestos hazards, and concluded that "the use of high-asbestos-containing thermal insulating materials should be curtailed due to hazards to the health of insulation workers" (Murdock, , p. 9) The survey was conducted "in an attempt to improve the insulation program of the Navy," and involved letter inquiries sent to Naval and private shipyards (Murdock, , p. 3) . Survey ndings included the following: "Shipboard practices on the handling of asbestos-containing materials occasionally showed failure to isolate working areas, improper ventilation, dusting due to emptying cement bags, failure to wet down insulation preliminary to ripout and disposal in polyethylene bags, and failure to wear coveralls and properly equipped and approved respirators" (Murdock, , p. 5).
In addition, "several responses from insulation manufacturers have indicated that new materials are being developed for the replacement of asbestos for thermal insulation" (Murdock, , p. 7). The letter concluded that "Naval and private shipyards as well as insulation suppliers are well aware of the serious hazards attending the use of asbestos. Nevertheless, considerable asbestoscontaining insulation material currently is being used in Naval applications and stringent handling precautions are not being enforced in all instances" (Murdock, , p. 9).
In 1970, ACGIH recommended lowering the TLV to 5 f/cc for bers greater than 5um and recommended a 15 min ceiling limit of 10 f/cc (ACGIH, ). Subsequently, in 1971, OSHA established regulations that promulgated PELs for asbestos, as well as over 400 other chemicals and substances used in the United States. OSHA published its rst permissible exposure limit (PEL) for asbestos of 12 f/cc as an eight-hour time weighted average in 1971. This limit was based on the proposed ACGIH TLV (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, ). Figure 9 shows the progression of asbestos exposure limits and recommendations through 1970. Display full size to co ogy a d ep de o ogy o at o o c e ca s t at ad bee gat e ed by go e e t, ta y, u e s ty, esea c bod es a d industry thus became more widely available, bringing the occupational health eld into the modern era.
Discussion
Many scientists and historians have discussed the state-of-knowledge relating to the recognition of asbestos hazards during the 20th century. However, that body of literature leaves some degree of uncertainty about the overall scienti c community's understanding of the asbestos hazard and the swiftness with which various governmental and other groups responded to the hazard that this family of di erent bers posed to those who worked with them.
We evaluated more than 300 documents in an attempt to understand when various scienti c and regulatory groups became concerned about the occupational hazards posed by chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, anthophylite, tremolite, and other asbestos forms. Our research has indicated that because of the economic importance of asbestos, and its perceived vital role in the war e ort, the regulated community and the military held a broad belief that overly restrictive work standards should not be applied to this material. Indeed, consistent with the setting of occupational limits for virtually all chemicals from about 1940 to 1995, the industrial hygiene community pushed to identify an occupational exposure limit for asbestos that was health protective, but not unduly burdensome on the regulated community (including the US Navy and its contractors). Figure 10 shows a timeline of key events and documents that signi cantly contributed to the understanding of asbestos and disease. The information we gathered indicates that the US government had a signi cant interest in understanding the hazards posed by all asbestos forms as far back as the late 1920s, as was apparent from its various research e orts in the 1930s and 1940s. This interest was stimulated, in part, because of the economic signi cance of asbestos, as well as its capacity to reduce the truly signi cant and tragic e ects of res that had haunted much of the population for the prior 200 years (Maines, ) . The concern about re hazards was nowhere greater than on board ships, on which not only are there ample quantities of combustibles, but there is also little chance of survival if the re should get out of hand. This fact was well recognized by the US Navy when it speci ed various building materials for ships used in WW II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. Indeed, as described here, the Navy was among the leaders in terms of initiating work practices that attempted to reduce exposure to various asbestos forms, as it wanted to ensure that asbestos could continue to be used on various ships (which it was, for nearly ve decades).
Although it is debatable whether the Navy or the private sector that supplied it with materials was more knowledgeable with respect to the hazards posed by asbestos, it is clear that the US government generally was the rst to understand its hazards, since it sponsored a large fraction of asbestos toxicology and/or epidemiology studies. This view is based on understanding the funding source for the early research at Saranac Lake laboratories, the many industrial hygiene studies conducted by the Navy, and the exceptionally well formulated occupational medical programs initiated by the Navy in the early 1940s (Forman, ) . Interestingly, according to Dr.
Samuel Forman, an expert in occupational health and a former medical doctor within the US Navy, the Navy occupational health practitioners did not depend upon information or advice from equipment manufacturers related to the health e ects of asbestos dust (Forman, ) . He stressed that when the Navy speci ed using a particular type of asbestos in a product, the supplier had no choice but to supply it in the manner speci ed; enforcement provisions were in place for those who failed to comply. but to supply it in the manner speci ed; enforcement provisions were in place for those who failed to comply.
The Navy and other government organizations continued to require using asbestos in hundreds of materials far into the 1970s, and later because of concern that other materials may not perform as well, and because of their belief that nearly any material could be handled safely if proper precautions were taken. This view was not limited to asbestos, but also included beryllium, all sources of radiation, cadmium, cobalt, nickel, plutonium, radium, and numerous other substances known for their high toxicity. The results of industrial hygiene studies conducted over several decades by not only the military, but by also by numerous researchers interested in asbestos, gave the military considerable con dence regarding its belief that education and controls could minimize or eliminate the vast majority of the risks.
It was apparent to the military and other institutions that used any asbestos forms, for example, that as occupational exposure limits grew smaller, studies needed to be conducted to quantitatively understand any hazard. The studies by Fleischer et al. ( ) were intended to alert the Navy about the hazards to those involved in ship building and decommissioning; they concluded (albeit erroneously) that if exposures were maintained below 5 mmpcf, the hazard was negligible. With each passing decade, though, other studies were conducted of not only those working with insulation (which had been clearly acknowledged as a serious hazard), but also of gaskets and packing, materials that often were required to contain asbestos (Mangold et al., , Mangold, ) .
Over the course of 20-30 years, from about 1970 to 2000, a number of additional studies of worker exposure to so-called "encapsulated materials" were conducted, and these, too, gave the military and others a fair degree of con dence that if handled in a reasonably prudent manner, asbestos containing materials would not pose a signi cant increased health hazard. Speci cally, studies were ), and other materials in which asbestos was used as a ller. Nearly all these studies were conducted after about 1975, addressed the possible hazards posed by products that were made primarily of encapsulated asbestos, and yielded results that were anticipated by Seliko and others in the early 1970s when they noted that "it is fortunate that the greatest part of [the U.S.'s asbestos use] has been in products in which the asbestos is 'locked in'-that is bound with cement or plastics or other binder so that there is no release, certainly no signi cant release, of asbestos ber in either working areas or general air" (Seliko , , p. 23).
In her 1974 edition of Industrial Toxicology, Alice Hamilton illustrated the uncertainty remaining in the scienti c community regarding the mechanism by which asbestos caused its e ects when she wrote: "Another important problem far from settled is whether asbestos bers acting as mechanical irritants deep in the lung are alone responsible for disease" (Hamilton & Hardy, , p. 421). She goes on to say that "several key facts are missing and great research e ort is currently directed to their solution" (Hamilton & Hardy, , p.
422).
Not surprisingly, it was the US military that encouraged the private sector to develop materials other than asbestos that would be equally e ective as a re retardant, but that would pose a lesser human health hazard. Over time, berglass and a few other materials were sometimes found to be an adequate substitute as an insulating material and as ller for polymeric materials. The military was aware that for many uses, however, there was no substitute equal to asbestos; nevertheless, ultimately the Navy concluded that it was virtually impossible to insure that everyone who handled these products would do so safely. Thus, by about 1990, the US government and most US manufacturing rms speci ed that no asbestos be present in virtually all the goods they sold or used (Maines, ).
In conclusion, the aim of this review was to provide a well-documented timeline of the knowledge of the hazards of asbestos within the scienti c community and governmental organizations, especially the Navy. Based on the published and unpublished studies, reports, and memorandums that we collected, we concluded that the Navy was at the forefront of asbestos research, and was aware of the degree of exposure of its contractors working with insulation. We also found that precautionary recommendations, which included using respirators or local ventilation, were speci c to friable types of asbestos-containing products such as insulation, and that these measures were not suggested for users of encapsulated materials, such as gaskets, oor tiles, mastics, sealers, and materials made of phenolic molding compounds. Many scientists inside and outside the government published on the correlation between asbestos and 
, and it is clear from the record that the Navy attempted to control exposures to concentrations that it considered acceptable. It began looking into substitute materials in the early 1970s, and appears to have eliminated most uses by about 1985.
